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Abstract 
CUrisk as a comprehensive fire risk analysis model have been under active development over the past decade. Recently a Barrier Failure 
submodel and a Fire Spread submodel have been integrated into the CUrisk system structure. CUrisk can provide data of barrier failure 
followed by results of fire spread through the Fire Spread submodel. This paper presented a fire risk analysis case study of a six-storey 
apartment building of light-frame construction, aimed at showing the performance of CUrisk and particularly the effect of wall barriers on 
building fire risk. The apartment building has 18 different designs of wall barriers, all of which are light frame assemblies but with different 
configurations. These wall barriers have different failure times under the unsuppressed fires in the apartment of fire origin, and consequently 
resulted in different times of fire spread to the adjacent compartments. The maps of fire spread in the unsuppressed fires at 60 minutes 
demonstrated good patterns and the important role of fire barriers in containing a fire. The impact of wall barrier designs on occupant risk 
is also discussed. Results showed that the building designed with better fire-resistive barriers could lead to lower occupant deaths, which 
are presented quantitatively. 
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1. Introduction 
The performance-based fire safe design concept accepted and practiced by a number of countries has allowed the 
construction of buildings that could not have been possible in a strictly prescriptive-code environment. To facilitate this work, 
some comprehensive fire risk assessment models have been developed, including FiRECAM [1] and FIERAsystem [2] in 
Canada, CESARE-Risk [3] in Australia, CRISP [4] in the UK and B-RISK [5] in New Zealand. These models were developed 
to simulate all aspects of a fire incident, such as fire growth, smoke movement and occupant evacuation, and attempted to 
account for the dynamic interactions among these aspects from the perspective of fire risk assessment. Indeed, this approach 
has its advantage over single-functionality models such as FDS [6] or evacuation models which could only simulate smoke 
spread or evacuation while overlook the dynamic interactions between them. All the aforementioned comprehensive fire risk 
analysis models have submodels to predict the fire development in the compartment of fire origin and smoke conditions in a 
building, using one or two zone models. They also have evacuation models to evaluate occupant safety under a fire. Most of 
them have an economic loss submodel to calculate fire damages. However, for the calculation of the barrier failure and fire 
spread, none of the models have satisfactory solutions. They either use extremely simple approaches or engineering judgement, 
or rely on results of external models that do not quite fit in their system structure.  
CUrisk [7] is a comprehensive fire risk analysis model developed at Carleton University in Canada. It can evaluate the 
overall fire risk of a building using selected fire scenarios based on the building characteristics and the available active and 
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passive fire protection systems. It includes a system model (see Fig.1) and more than ten submodels. The system model sets 
up a predetermined set of procedures to coordinate all the submodels. When performing a fire risk analysis, fire scenarios are 
generated by the Fire Scenario submodel. For each fire scenario, building fire tenability conditions are predicted by the 
submodels of Fire Growth, Smoke Movement, Barrier Failure and Fire Spread, considering the intervention of active fire 
protection systems such as sprinklers, detectors, alarms or the fire department. Furthermore, occupant response and evacuation 
processes are simulated incorporating the effects of building tenability conditions on occupant movement and behaviour, and 
the resulting life risks are predicted. Economic losses due to fires are also calculated using the Economic Loss submodel. 
After addressing all the fire scenarios for a specific design, the two final output parameters, Fire Cost Expectation and 
Expected Risk to Life, are determined.  
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Fig.1 A schematic of the system model of CUrisk 
Some major improvements of CUrisk have been made in the last few years. Improvements have been made on the two-
zone Smoke Movement submodel [8] to describe heat and mass transfer across the interface between the upper and lower 
layers. Modifications were also made in this submodel to consider the contribution of timber components to fire in timber 
constructions [9]. Most importantly, a fully integrated Barrier Failure submodel and a Fire Spread submodel were added to 
CUrisk. The Barrier Failure submodel [10] was developed based on the concept of component subtractive method. It can 
produce barrier failure probabilities in any given fire severity by taking into account the uncertainties of some factors that 
affect the assembly failure. The Fire Spread submodel [10,11] is a probabilistic model based on Bayesian network approach, 
and can produce the time-dependent fire spread probabilities from the compartment of fire origin to any other compartment 
in the building during a fire scenario.  
In CUrisk, the Occupant Response submodel [12] is used to predict the response of occupants in fire emergencies. The 
occupant response model predicts the probabilities of occupants perceiving fire signals due to direct perception, receiving fire 
alarms signals after the activation of local alarms, central alarm and voice alarm. The Occupant Evacuation submodel [13] 
uses a coarse network approach to describe a building and an individual perspective to represent occupants and then provides 
the data of evacuation route and time of each occupant to the Life Hazard submodel. Life risk are calculated by the Life 
Hazard submodel, and presented as number of deaths and injuries. The life risk of individual occupants is determined based 
on their egress path and the fire hazard conditions along that path. The probability of death of each occupant is a combined 
effect of heat, toxic gases and fire spread. The Expected Risk to Life is one of the two final decision-making parameters, 
defined as the expected death frequency per year per individual of a building. Besides, the Economic Loss Submodel together 
with the Building Cost Submodel calculate economic losses incurred for each fire scenario, based on fire conditions, 
economic values of contents, and damage criteria. Similar to ERL, the Fire Cost Expectation (FCE) is the other final decision-
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making parameter of CUrisk. ERL and FCE can be directly used as a decision-making parameter if there is available reference 
data or can be compared with that of another similar, but deemed-to-satisfy code-compliant building. 
In this paper, a fire risk analysis case study is conducted to demonstrate the functionality and performance of CUrisk after 
the recent improvements. In particular, emphasis is given to the role of the Barrier Failure submodel and the Fire Spread 
submodel on evaluating the occupant risk in combination with other submodels. 
2. A case study using CUrisk  
2.1. Design of Case Study 
The upcoming National Building Code of Canada (NBCC) will allow the construction of combustible light-frame 
residential and office buildings up to 6 storeys. This is an increase from NBCC 2010 [14] which had a limit of four storeys 
for combustible construction. Accordingly, a six-storey light-frame apartment building is created for the case study. Its floor 
plan and dimensions are shown in Fig.2. The total floor area is 805 m2, with a floor height of 3 m. Each floor has ten 2-
bedroom apartments (8 m by 8 m) with 5 of them on each side of a 40 m by 1.5 m corridor. At each end of the floor there is 
a common area, an elevator (concealed) and a stair room (fully open to the common area). The layouts of all the floors are 
identical except that two exits (2 m by 2 m) to the outside are located at the two ends of the first floor. The design of all the 
apartments is the same.  Each apartment has a living room, a kitchen and 2 bedrooms. The partitions within all the apartment 
are ignored, and each apartment is considered as one compartment in the CUrisk simulation. Each apartment has a door (2 m 
high by 0.9 m wide) opening to the corridor and a window measuring (1.5 m high by 4.5 m wide). A door measuring 2 m high 
by 0.9 m wide connects the corridors and the common areas. All the doors of the apartments (to the corridors), corridors and 
the building entrances are set to 10% open, and all the windows are assumed to break at 300 °C. 
 
(a)  
(b)  
Fig.2 (a) Floor plan of the first storey Figure, (b) Dimensions of apartment and other spaces 
It is assumed that 4 persons occupy each apartment (2 occupants are located in each bedroom) which is the design occupant 
load specified by the National Building Code of Canada (NBCC) 2010 [14]. The occupants are assumed to be 50% male, 50% 
female, 50% adults and 50% children.  
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Active fire protection systems are installed in the building as per code requirements. Sprinklers are installed in all the 
apartments and corridors. Smoke alarms are installed in all the apartments, and smoke detectors are installed in all the corridors 
and stair rooms. The time of Fire Department action is divided into notification time, response time and setup time, which are 
set to be 30 s, 360 s, and 120 s, respectively. 
2.2. Design of fire barriers 
Fire barriers comprise walls, floors, doors and windows. In this case study, eighteen types of apartment wall barriers are 
designed and listed in Table 1. These walls are of light-frame construction and their failure behaviour is calculated by the 
Barrier Failure submodel. All the wood studs or steel studs are nominal 2 inch by 4 inch (38.1 mm by 88.9 mm in engineering 
practice) with a spacing of 400 mm o.c. The cavity is either void or filled with glass fiber or rock fiber. Type X gypsum boards 
of 1/2 inch (12.7 mm) or 3/8 inch (15.9 mm) are used.  
To compare the impact of different wall barriers on the building fire risk, it is assumed that all wall barriers in the same 
building are of the same type. This leads to 18 building designs constructed with 18 types of wall barriers, respectively. All 
other barriers (floors, doors and windows) are the same in all the 18 building designs.  
Table 1 List of apartment walls 
Wall # Studs type Cavity filling Gypsum board 
thickness (mm) 
Number of layers 
on both sides 
1 Wood Void 12.7 1 
2 Wood Glass Fiber 12.7 1 
3 Wood Rock Fiber 12.7 1 
4 Wood Void 15.9 1 
5 Wood Glass Fiber 15.9 1 
6 Wood Rock Fiber 15.9 1 
7 Wood Void 12.7 2 
8 Wood Glass Fiber 12.7 2 
9 Wood Rock Fiber 12.7 2 
10 Steel Void 12.7 1 
11 Steel Glass Fiber 12.7 1 
12 Steel Rock Fiber 12.7 1 
13 Steel Void 15.9 1 
14 Steel Glass Fiber 15.9 1 
15 Steel Rock Fiber 15.9 1 
16 Steel Void 12.7 2 
17 Steel Glass Fiber 12.7 2 
18 Steel Rock Fiber 12.7 2 
2.3. Design of fire scenarios  
Design fires in the apartments are specified based on statistical data and engineering judgement, whereas fire scenarios in 
other compartments such as corridors, common areas and staircases are ignored due to extremely low fire loads in those areas 
that could not support sustainable fires. According to Canadian statistics [15], for family dwellings the mean value of fire load 
density is 500 MJ/m2. The 80th and 90th percentile values are 750 MJ/m2 and 825 MJ/m2, respectively. The design fire load 
is usually chosen as a value between the 80th and 95th percentile [16]. In this study, a 90th percentile of 825 MJ/m2 is chosen 
as the fire load density in each apartment. To be on the conservative side, a fast growth t-square fire (0.19 kW/s2 [17]) is 
specified for the fire growth period of the design fire, and the nominal maximum heat release rate of the design fire is set to 
17.6 MW. The actual size of the fully developed fire and the time of the decay phase are calculated by the Smoke Movement 
submodel based on the ventilation conditions of apartment and the available fire loads. 
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The event tree method is adopted to create fire scenarios clusters. The fundamental events that affect the fire consequences 
include the initiating event and some intervening events. The initiating event is the start of fire. Two fire locations and their 
respective occurrence probabilities are created based on statistical data. The occurrence time of the fire (daytime or nighttime) 
is also an important factor that affects the fire consequences especially life risk, as occupants need longer time to respond to 
the fire at night. The Occupant Response submodel is able to simulate the response behavior during daytime or night time. 
Statistical data [18] show that 20% of the fires occurred at night from 11pm to 7am when people are sleeping, and 80% occur 
in daytime. The intervening events include the reliability of activation of fire sprinklers, detectors and alarms, and the 
reliability of the Fire Department action. Sprinkler reliability is a combination of the operational probability and performance 
probability which is 87% based on the US statistical data [19]. Reliability of smoke detectors is 86% [20]. Fire department 
has a probability of 75% to arrive at the fire scene and begin firefighting in 8 minutes [21]. It should be noted that the reliability 
of detector and alarm systems is already considered in the Occupant Response submodel, thus is not included in the event tree. 
Using the event tree method, 16 fire scenarios are created as shown in Fig.3. 
 
 
Fig.3 Event tree demonstrating the cluster of fire scenarios 
To calculate the final two decision making parameters Expected Risk to Life and Fire Cost Expectation, the annual fire 
frequency, design life of the building, fire scenarios and their probabilities are needed. The Ontario (a province in Canada) 
statistical data shows the residential fire ignition frequency to be 2.61 × 10-3 per unit per year [22], therefore, the annual fire 
frequency of the 60-apartment building can be estimated as 0.1566 per year. The design life of the building is set to be 50 
years. The simulation time for all the scenarios is 3600 s, with a time step of 2 s in simulation. 
3. Results and discussion of the case study 
3.1. Fire development 
Fig.4 shows the fire temperature development profile in Apt.1 (see Fig.2) with or without fire suppression, computed by 
the Smoke Movement submodel for Scenario 1 to Scenario 4 (see Fig.3). The black solid curve is the fire temperature profile 
without any fire suppression in Scenario 4; the red dash curve shows the fire temperature with only Fire Department 
intervention in Scenario 3; the brown short dash curve demonstrates the impact of fire sprinkler activation and the blue dot 
curve shows the fire development under both the fire sprinkler and Fire Department intervention. 
The fire under no suppression indicates the fire growth, fully developed and decay periods, with a peak temperature of 
about 1300qC. Fire department firefighting takes effect at around 10 minutes and the fire begins to decay at around 17 minutes 
and drops to around 400qC at the end of the 60 minute simulation time. Under the intervention of the fire sprinkler (or together 
with the Fire Department operation), fire temperature only reaches up to about 180qC. The fire temperature profiles in Apt.3 
in Scenario 5 to 8 are basically the same as the results in Apt.1. These fire temperature profiles are used in other CUrisk 
submodels to calculate the life risk and fire damages. 
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Fig.4 Smoke layer temperature in the apartment of fire origin Apt.1 
3.2. Barrier failure  
The primary purpose of this case study is to show the effects of different fire barriers on the fire spread process. Outputs 
of the Barrier Failure submodel are directly used by the Fire Spread submodel to produce the probability of fire spread. The 
following graphs (Fig.5, Fig.6, and Fig.7) demonstrate the probability of barrier failure and fire spread for the 18 types of wall 
barriers shown in Table 1.  
Fig.5 shows the probability of barrier failure of all the 18 wall barriers under the fire in Scenario 4. These wall barriers 
work as boundaries of the apartment of fire origin which is Apt.1, and thus are directly exposed to the free-growing fire (see 
black solid curve in Fig.4). The 18 wall barriers demonstrate different barrier failure times ranging from 23 minutes to 60 
minutes. Among them, barrier 10 and Barrier 1 have the earliest failure times between 22 minutes and 25 minutes, and Barrier 
10 leads to a bit earlier failure time than Barrier 1. This is followed by failure of Barrier 11, distributed around 24 to 25 
minutes; and then Barrier 2, distributed between 27.5 minutes to 29.3 minutes. After that, Barrier 13 and Barrier 4 fail slightly 
after 30 minutes. Barrier 14 fails at around 34 minutes, and Barrier 4 (same as barrier 14 but timber frame) fails between 34 
minutes to 37 minutes. Further, Barrier 7 and Barrier 16 have the same probability distribution of failure times which ranges 
from 51 minutes to 60 minutes. All other types of wall barriers show no sign of failure during the 60 minute simulation time, 
and they are unlikely to fail even if the simulation time is increased because the fire has already entered the late decay phase. 
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Fig.5 Probability of barrier failure of the 18 types of walls located in the apartment of fire origin under unsuppressed fires in Scenario 4 
Fig.6 displays the probability of barrier failure of all the 18 wall barriers under fire in Scenario 3, and they are directly 
exposed to the fire in Apt.1 under the intervention of Fire Department (see red dash curve in Fig.4). Compared with the early 
and effective fire suppression with fire sprinklers, which suppresses the fire in its early growth phase, firefighting from the 
Fire Department is not able to prevent the fire going into the fully developed period. Consequentially, fire is able to cause 
failure of four types of wall barriers, as shown in Fig.6. Two of them are Barrier 10 and Barrier 1, which fail at around 27 
minutes. The other two are Barrier 13 and Barrier 4, which fail in tandem between 37 minutes and 40 minutes. All other types 
of wall barriers did not fail. 
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Fig.6 Probability of barrier failure of the 18 types of walls located in the apartment of fire origin under Fire Department intervened fires in Scenario 3 
3.3. Fire spread 
After the run of the Barrier Failure submodel, the Fire Spread submodel calculates the probability of fire spread in all 
compartments in the building. Fig.7 demonstrates the probability of fire spread to Apt. 2 resulting from the fire in Apt. 1 in 
Scenario 4. These results are a direct consequence of the barrier failure calculated by the Barrier Failure submodel as illustrated 
in Fig.5. The initiation times of the probability distribution of fire spread for the 18 wall barriers follow the same time sequence 
as the results of the barrier failure times, but occur at later times due to the fact that it takes time for the fire in Apt. 2 to be 
ignited and grow to a fully developed fire. The fire may continue to grow and spread to other compartments in the building, 
and these fire spread outputs are further processed in other submodels to estimate fire losses. 
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Fig.7 Probability of fire spread in Apt. 2 from Apt. 1in Scenario 4 comparing 18 types of wall barriers 
A fire initiated in a compartment can spread beyond the compartment of fire origin to adjacent compartments either on the 
same floor or floor above, and the worst case is that an uncontrolled fire could affect more building areas. Fig.8 (a) illustrates 
the eventual probability of fire spread at 60 minutes in Fire Scenario 4 where the fire initiates in Apt. 1, whereas Fig.8 (b) 
shows the results of Scenario 8 when Apt. 3 is the room of fire origin. Please note that in both scenarios no fire suppression 
is undertaken. 
In both fire scenarios, the fire on the first floor spreads up to the 5th floor through external windows. Horizontally, the fire 
can spread to the room across the corridor by breaching the two door barriers, for example, from Apt.1 to Apt.6 in Scenario 
4, from Apt.3 to Apt.8 in Scenario 8, or from Apt.11 to Apt.16, and so on. The above fire spread results are largely affected 
by the failure of windows and doors rather than wall barriers, thus the types of wall barrier have a small impact.  
The wall barriers play a more important role in fire spread across adjacent apartments separated by them. Just as the time 
sequence of failure demonstrated in Fig.5 and time sequence of fire spread in Fig.7, wall Barrier 1 and Barrier 10 lead to the 
broadest fire spread on the floor of fire origin, including three adjacent apartments (Apt.1 to Apt.3) in Scenario 4 and five 
adjacent apartments (Apt. 1 to Apt.5) in Scenario 8, respectively. Similar results are found on the floors above. Lower levels 
of adjacent fire spreads are found with Barriers 2, 4, 5, 11, 13 and 14. Other barriers generate no adjacent fire spreads. 
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Fig.8 Probability of fire spread on the 1st and 2nd floor at 60 minutes in (a) Scenario 4 and in (b) Scenario 8, comparing 18 types of wall barriers 
3.4. Life risk 
The Monte Carlo approach is adopted in the Occupant Evacuation submodel, and 2000 Monte Carlo loops are used in this 
case study. Correspondingly, the same number of runs are conducted for the Fire Spread submodel and the Life Hazard 
submodel. As a result, in the following discussion the mean parameter values of the 2000 runs are presented whenever 
mentioned.  
Results suggest that fire spread has limited impact on occupant life risk in all the pre-defined fire scenarios and building 
designs. Simulation results indicate that no death is attributed to fire spread for the daytime fire scenarios (Scenario 1 to 8, 
see Fig.3) whereas only a small amount of deaths occurred in the night-time fire scenarios. Deaths and injuries are mainly 
caused by heat and toxic gases according to outputs of the Life Hazard submodel.  
Fig.9(a) shows the mean occupant evacuation times of all the occupants in Scenario 4 and the building designed with wall 
Barrier 1. It illustrates why fire spread fails to threat life in the daytime fires. The occupant number in the horizontal axis is 
counted from the first floor to the top floor with 40 occupants on each floor. It can be found that occupants in the apartment 
of fire origin (Apt.1) evacuate the building at the earliest time, around 4.2 minutes on average, before the fire reaches flashover 
(see bottom left corner in Fig.9(a)). Apart from that, the evacuation times are basically grouped by floors, showing higher 
mean evacuation times in higher storeys. However, compared with occupant evacuation times, fire spread occurs much later. 
The first fire spread occurs from the apartment of fire origin to Apt.11, which occurs at around 20 minutes far beyond the 
evacuation times. Similar results are found in all other daytime fire scenarios and building designs.  
During the night-time fire scenarios (Scenario 9 to 16), occupants need more time to respond to the fire, thus the evacuation 
times are longer than in daytime fires. Results show some deaths resulting from fire spread. The death predictions of fire 
Scenario 16 are shown in Fig.9(b), which is a worst-case fire scenario where no fire prevention is applied. This figure presents 
the total number of deaths due to fire spread when fire occurred in buildings constructed with 10 different wall barrier types. 
The death numbers are not integers because they are averaged from the Monte Carlo repetitions. Wall barrier types affect the 
total number of deaths, showing the earlier the wall barrier fails, the more deaths occur. The only one exception is the 
comparison between Barrier 1 and Barrier 2 but their deaths values are very close. Light Steel Frame walls lead to slightly 
more deaths than the Light Wood Frame counterparts. The rest of 8 wall barriers (Barrier 6, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 18) generate 
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the same level of deaths as Barrier 3 and 12, thus are not included in the figure. In conclusion, the Barrier Failure submodel 
enables CUrisk to handle the impact of fire barrier on life risk and fire loss. It was shown that for the 6-storey apartment 
building fire spread contributes little to the life risk compared with heat and toxic gases. For instance, results indicate that for 
the building designed with wall Barrier 1 in Scenario 16, the number of deaths due to fire spread is around 0.85, whereas the 
total death number of deaths (due to heat, toxic gases and fire spread) is 4.9. 
 
(a)
0 40 80 120 160 200 240
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
7.0
7.5
8.0
8.5
6th 
Floor
5th 
Floor
4th 
Floor
3rd 
Floor
2nd 
Floor
M
ea
n 
E
va
cu
at
io
n 
T
im
e 
(m
in
ut
e)
Occupant Number
1st 
Floor
Fire Spread initiation beyond this time point
(b)
1 2 3 4 5 10 11 12 13 14
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 T
ot
al
 n
um
be
r 
of
 d
ea
th
 (
pe
rs
on
)
Wall Barrier Number
 
Fig.9 (a): mean evacuation time of each occupant in Scenario 4 and in the building designed with Wall Barrier 1; (b): total probability of death due to fire 
spread in Scenario 16, comparing 10 different types of wall barriers 
4. Conclusion 
Fire safety engineering is an interdisciplinary area that involves the dynamic connection of relatively distant fields, such 
as fire dynamics, material science and human behaviour, etc. The difficulties of performance-based fire safety solutions lie in 
the comprehension of those fields and appropriately use them to reach the safety objectives. This is the original intention of 
developing comprehensive fire risk assessment models. Although there are a number of powerful models widely used in fire 
safety engineering applications, such as CFD models to simulate fire growth and smoke spread as well as egress models to 
simulate the occupant evacuation process inside a building, the weakness, however, is that the full picture of the fire incident 
is not pieced together. For example, in egress models smoke and fire hazard could impair occupants’ movement speed or 
affect their route choices. Meanwhile, occupants’ reaction could possibly change the development of fire.  
Comprehensive fire risk assessment models such as CUrisk not only contain submodels of different functions but also 
reflect the dynamic interaction among the different submodels. Furthermore, with the recent developments, CUrisk is able to 
predict the failure of barriers and the resulting fire spread beyond the room of fire origin, and to further calculate the effect of 
barrier failure and fire spread on life safety. In order to demonstrate this, a case study was presented in this paper, which 
showed that different construction of wall barriers led to different barrier failure times. The application of active fire protection 
systems such as fire sprinkler or fire department caused reduced levels of barrier failure or no failure at all. As the direct cause 
of fire spread, the barrier failure results were used as a factor to calculate fire spread across the building. The results 
demonstrated that the different construction of wall barriers resulted in different levels of fire spread. In addition, as an 
integrated process, fire spread gave rise to certain level of life risk to occupants, although this consequence might be limited 
due to the time frame differences between time of fire spread and time of evacuation.  
 Through this case study it is intended to show the performance of the CUrisk as a comprehensive fire risk assessment 
model, more importantly to bring to attention the fact that fire incident is a complicated and dynamic process such that more 
researches in this matter shall be conducted.  
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